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SWEDISH LABOR ISM
Abstract
Among capitalist economies Sweden has the most unionized labor
market, the largest public sector, and the most equal disposable-
income distribution. The paper examines some of the effects of big
labor and big government. Wage pressure has generated inflation
rather than unemployment and has narrowed wage differentials, thus
extinguishing market signals. Very high marginal income-tax rates
have distorted the choice between leisure and work and have stimulated
an underground economy. Moving closer to the "single" European market
of 1992 and to the European Monetary System, Sweden will find it
harder to pursue her traditionally independent economic policy.

SWEDISH LABOR ISM
HANS BREMS*
I. SCHUMPETERIAN SWEDEN
1. Schumpeter (1912): Innovation
Swedish economic history is Schumpeterian in the sense of an
early Schumpeter: brilliant in engineering and organization Swedish
pioneers founded corporations like ASEA, Atlas, Electrolux, Ericsson,
SKF, and Volvo and were so successful that Sweden was soon too small
for them: the twenty largest Swedish multinationals taken together
have as many employees outside Sweden as inside. Within a Schumpeter-
ian framework such innovation was recorded and analyzed by Dahmen
[1950 (1970)].
2. Schumpeter (1942, 1949): Laborism
But Swedish economic and social history is also Schumpeterian in
the sense of a later Schumpeter (1942, 1949): the very efficiency of
capitalism would undermine the social institutions protecting it.
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Foretnost among such institutions was a large class of proprietors.
They count at the ballot box and are politically less vulnerable than
the large corporation. But as it turned out in Sweden in the fifties
and sixties, they would be economically more vulnerable than the large
corporation. The fifties and sixties were the heyday of "the Swedish
model" [Lundberg (1985)], i.e., a teamwork of unions, industry, and
government
.
Always favoring new technology, unions kept up a relentless wage
pressure but in the name of "wage solidarity" refused to accept inter-
firm or interindustry wage differentials. Large corporations
cooperated by designing ever more productive new vintages of plant and
equipment and discarding old ones sooner. Proprietorships which
failed to keep pace disappeared as victims of wage solidarity. As
Eliasson (1988: 163) has shown, in 1980 the four largest Swedish cor-
porations (Volvo, Electrolux, ASEA, and Ericsson) combined generated
22 percent of value added by Swedish manufacturing—more than twice as
much as in 1950.
Government cooperated by subsidizing labor mobility, thus helping
to resettle labor released from old vintages, industries, or proprie-
torships. Released labor was also absorbed in a rapidly growing public
sector: better health care, better education, larger transfer payments
But never, for forty-four years of labor government, did the public
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sector expand in the form of nationalization of industry: the produc-
tion of private goods was left in private hands.
This was not socialism as Schumpeter (1942: 167) had defined it:
"an institutional pattern in which the control over means of produc-
tion and over production itself is vested with a central authority."
But as Smithies (1950: 20) pointed out, towards the end of his life
Schumpeter (1949) "seemed to be veering to the view that what he
called 'laborism' might have a long, dull, and unimaginative future."
Schumpeter lived to see neither the heyday nor the ultimate demise
of the Swedish model. In the fifties and sixties an ever larger
public sector became superimposed on an ever smaller private one. The
very sector which had to absorb, and adjust to, outside shocks became
smaller. As a result, by 1974 the Swedish economy was more vulnerable
than other OECD economies to the oil shocks and to Japanese competi-
tion in shipbuilding and steel. Nowhere in the OECD economies was the
decline of industrial production after 1974 as protracted as in Sweden:
the other economies surpassed their 1974 level by 1977, Sweden not
until 1980. Trying to save jobs by massive subsidies and—ironically
—
by outright nationalization, the center-conservative-liberal government
coming to power in 1976 no doubt delayed the necessary transformation
of Swedish industry. In the early eighties the symptoms were a double-
digit inflation, a public-sector deficit of 6 percent of gross domestic
product, and a negative current account on the balance of payments.
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3. A Fresh Start
Without a majority, labor was returned to power by the 1982 elec-
tion, retained it after the elections of 1985 and 1988, and sought
ad-hoc parliamentary support from Communists, Environmentalists, or
Liberals. Denationalizations and two massive devaluations gave Sweden
a fresh start in a gentle international tailwind. The international
upswing, the lower price of oil, and the lower dollar made inflation
subside and made the current account turn positive. Unemployment
stayed below 3 percent.
But big labor and big government still dominate the Swedish scene,
and let us look at them in turn.
II. BIG LABOR
1. The Labor Market
Among capitalist economies Sweden has the highest union density:
according to Freeman (1988a: 69) 95 percent of nonagricultural wage
and salary workers were unionized in 1984-1985 versus 18 percent of
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the U.S. labor market. Whether employed by government or by private
industry, Swedish blue-collar workers are organized in the Federation
of Labor, Lands organisationen . White-collar workers have their own
federation, Tjanstemannens Cent ra lorgani sat ion . On the other side of
the bargaining table is government or, in private industry, the
Federation of Employers, Svenska Arbetsgivaref orenlngen—without
counterpart in the United States. How have Swedish unions used their
power?
2. A Natural Rate of Unemployment
Demand for labor is a short-run commitment to be determined by
maximization of profits. Here the firm may consider its physical
capital stock a constant, maximize its gross profit with respect to
employment, and hire labor until the last man costs as much as he
contributes. Under pure competition the real wage rate will then
equal the physical marginal productivity of labor. Consequently the
demand for labor will simply be labor's physical marginal productivity
curve. Facing such a downward-sloping demand curve, what will labor
do?
Current labor-market literature, e.g., Lindbeck and Snower (1986)
and Blanchard and Summers (1988) distinguish between "insiders," who
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are employed hence decision-making, and "outsiders," who are unem-
ployed hence disenfranchised. Facing our downward-sloping demand
curve for labor, the decision-making insiders can, in the short run,
have a higher real wage rate by accepting some unemployment of the
disenfranchised outsiders. Let the insiders accept a rate of unem-
ployment which is "natural" in the sense that if actual unemployment
is less than natural, insiders will insist on a higher real wage rate,
If actual unemployment equals natural, they will be happy with the
existing real wage rate. If actual unemployment is greater than
natural, they will settle for a lower real wage rate.
What is the implied slope of the Phillips curve? Let the money
wage rate be w and price P, and let labor be able to negotiate real
wage rates. Then the particular levels w and P wouldn't matter as
long as their ratio w/P were the real wage rate insiders would be
happy with given their natural rate of unemployment. Those levels
could be anything: the Phillips curve would be vertical.
In Sweden labor negotiates money, not real, wage rates, so short
contract periods will have to do, and a temporarily finite slope of
the Phillips curve is possible. For example, let an expansionary
Keynesian policy stimulate demand, public as well as private, and let
price respond more readily than does the money wage rate. Then firms
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will experience a temporary reduction of the real wage rate, tempo-
rarily reducing the actual rate of unemployment below its natural rate.
But at the next round of collective bargaining, labor will undo the
unemployment effect. Once again the government may try to stimulate
demand. Repeated attempts by government to apply Keynesian policy to
non-Keynesian unemployment will generate successive rounds of temporary
reductions of unemployment but also successive rounds of wage and price
inflation.
Does Sweden have such a Phillips curve with a finite slope? In
its economic survey of Sweden the OECD (1987: 35) offered one. Its
horizontal axis measured the difference between unemployment rates in
Sweden and in the OECD-countries. Its vertical axis measured the dif-
ference between manufacturing money-wage increases in Sweden and in
the OECD-countries. A band of 17 observations 1971-1987 displayed a
slope of -2. At much lower unemployment than the outside world and a
Phillips-curve slope as steep as -2, the Swedish money wage rate will
eventually be growing faster than that of the outside world, thus
making devaluation inevitable.
However excessive, the Swedish money-wage pressure failed to catch
up with the 1977, 1981, and 1982 devaluations. Indeed by 1987 merely
one-third of the competitive edge created by the devaluations had been
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eaten up by Swedish money-wage increases exceeding those of the out-
side world. Gylfason (1987: 254-255) observed that over the ten
years 1977-1987 the Swedish hourly real wage rate declined by about
one-tenth hence was flexible enough to let the devaluations work as
intended. And over a longer period, i.e., the twenty-five years 1960-
1985 Freeman (1988b: 296-297) found countries in most of OECD-Europe
to have had larger increases in their real wage rates and smaller
increases in their employment than had the United States and Sweden.
The pairing of low-union-density United States with high-union-density
Sweden was also noticed by Ergas and Shafer (1987-1988: 19-20) and by
Barro (1988: 36).
3. Wage Differentials
Behind the abstraction of an overall wage rate we find the reality
of specific wage differentials. In the name of "wage solidarity"
Swedish labor unions have used their substantial power to reduce wage
differentials—all sorts of wage differentials: between government
and industry, between industries, between firms in the same industry,
between skilled and unskilled, and between male and female labor.
Such reduction of wage differentials raises problems.
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Econoraists know that in the short run such interference with the
market mechanism will generate excess demand for labor priced too low.
Excess demand has manifested itself in wage drift. Economists also
know that interference will generate excess supply of labor priced too
high. Excess supply has manifested itself in a chronic unemployment
of youngsters and oldsters alike. Such chronic unemployment has been
disguised by removing both groups from the labor market, the youngsters
by training schemes and public works, and oldsters by premature pen-
sioning. Finally economists know that in the long run wage differen-
tials too narrow to reflect differences in skill and education will
reduce the incentives to acquire such skill and education. Both for
Sweden and the U.S. the Brookings report [Bosworth-Rivlin (1987)]
found a significant and positive rate of return on education but found
the Swedish rate to be lower than the U.S. rate.
4. Government As An Employer
An important wage differential is the differential between govern-
ment and industry, so let us take a closer look at government as an
employer. Government produces public goods and faces little competi-
tion. Indeed public goods are not distributed via a market in the
first place but are produced according to the law and made available
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to qualified recipients at zero price—as are the services of Swedish
defense, police, hospitals, schools, and universities. In 1986 the
sum of public-sector consumption and investment was 31 percent of
gross domestic product, and public-sector employment was 41 percent of
all employment. In the seventies civil servants got the right to
strike and in the eighties became increasingly militant. A labor con-
flict would seriously disrupt a flow of services the government is
committed to deliver and the recipients depend on. Should such services
cost more to produce, taxes may always be raised, Lazear (1988: 61).
What all this means is that government finds it hard to resist
wage demands—harder than does private industry. Rational unions
would follow the path of least resistance and bargain first with
government, next with industry, asking for matching increases. Until
1975 industry traditionally opened collective bargaining. But after
1975 the rapidly growing public sector has occasionally assumed the
role of a wage leader.
We shall understand the role of government as a wage leader even
better when we look into wage differentials within government: govern-
ment wage differentials are traditionally narrower than private ones.
At the top end of the scale the highest-paid government employees are
paid less than the highest-paid private ones. As a result government
finds it difficult to keep its best computer experts, tax experts,
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professors, or airforce pilots. At the opposite end of the scale the
lowest-paid government employees are paid more than the lowest-paid
private ones. As a result the private sector finds it difficult to
keep skilled blue-collar workers, and unions will try to make the pri-
vate wage rate match the public one. Again the public sector becomes
the wage leader.
Big government is much more than an employer.
III. BIG GOVERNMENT
1. Public-Sector Expenditure
Define the public sector as central government, local government,
and the social-security authorities. Then by 1986 the public sector
consumed 28 percent and invested 3 percent of the gross domestic
product.
But transfer payments, no part of the gross domestic product, are
the hallmark of the welfare state. In 1986 the public sector dis-
tributed transfer payments amounting to 33 percent of the gross
domestic product.
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Sorae Swedish transfer payments have (less generous) U.S. counter-
parts such as unemployment and social-security benefits. But other
categories have no U.S. counterparts: with government-financed pay
Swedish parents, for example, are entitled to a 12-month maternity or
paternity leave to be divided between man and wife as they prefer. A
large network of government-financed day-care centers provides labor-
intensive care: two trained adults for every five children under
three. The government pays family allowances for each child under
sixteen, rising steeply with family size.
2. The Swedish Lorenz Curve
Household income distribution may be displayed graphically by a
Lorenz curve: on the horizontal axis arrange households according to
income, beginning with the poorest households. The vertical axis
shows the percent of household income earned by the poorest x percent
of households shown on the horizontal axis. If all households had the
same income the Lorenz curve would be a diagonal: x percent of the
households would earn x percent of household income. Our diagram
shows Lorenz curves for factor income and disposable income in Sweden,
1984. Factor income is income earned in current production.
Disposable income is factor income plus transfer payments including
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social-security benefits minus taxes including social-security pre-
miums. Our diagram shows that the poorest 20 percent of the house-
holds earn no factor income at all but do earn about 10 percent of all
household disposable income. Because of her narrow wage differentials
Sweden's factor-income Lorenz curve is unusually high. Because of her
generous transfer payments and high taxes Sweden's disposable-income
Lorenz curve is also unusually high—lying about halfway between a
diagonal and the factor-income Lorenz curve.
3. Public-Sector Revenue
By 1986 public-sector expenditure on consumption, investment, and
transfer payments summed to 64 percent of gross domestic product. How
was such expenditure financed? Nontax revenue such as surpluses of
public enterprises and interest received did yield about 7 percent of
gross domestic product. But what mattered was tax revenue.
High taxation is recent in Sweden. Overall tax revenue rose from
less than 30 percent of gross domestic product in 1960 to 55 percent
in 1987—the world's highest!
Marginal tax rates around 70 percent seriously distort the leisure-
work choice. Let an employee make 100 kronor per hour and make two
assumptions dear to neoclassical theory. First, the employee will
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extend his leisure to the point where his last leisure hour is just
worth his take-home pay had he worked that hour, i.e., a mere 30
kronor . Second, an employer will hire labor to the point where the
last man hired adds a product just worth his gross pay, i.e., a full
100 kronor . If the employee decides to spend his hour as leisure,
then, the economy is in effect giving up 100 kronor 's worth of product
to give him a mere 30 kronor 's worth of leisure. If leisure carried
its true and full price tag, the employee might demand less of it.
To establish the numerical correlation between labor supply and
tax structure was attempted by neither the Brookings report (1987)
itself nor the Soderstrora (1987) comments on it. Instead a cross-
country comparison showed that between 1965 and 1985, when the margi-
nal tax rate rose from 55 to 71 percent, the number of hours worked
per Swedish employee aged 25-64 declined sharply: by 18 percent for
men and 25 percent for women. In the United States the corresponding
decline was 6 percent for men and women alike.
4. The Underground Economy
High marginal tax rates may reduce the labor supply or drive it
underground. Using a method pioneered by Cagan (1958), Lundager and
Schneider (1986) assumed the tax-evading sector to be cash-financed.
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For 1955-1982 they could then estimate its share of gross national
product from a per-capita real-cash-balance demand function using
interest, consumption, income, habits of payment, and the marginal tax
rate as its independent variables.
for 1975-1982 Lundager and Schneider found the Swedish underground
economy to be fluctuating between 11 and 13 percent of gross national
product—somewhat higher than in Norway and Denmark whose marginal tax
rates were lower.
5. Tax Reform
That high marginal tax rates reduce the labor supply or drive it
underground is by now well understood by Swedish public debate.
Perhaps inspired by recent bold tax reform in the United States and
Denmark, the Swedish Parliament is now seriously discussing a near-
revenue-neutral tax reform. The reform would reduce progressivity by
adopting a three-level central-government income tax with marginal
rates of 33, 45, and 60 percent and a local-government flat rate of 30
percent. As in the United States and Denmark such lower rates would
be made possible by eliminating deductions and broadening tax bases.
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6. Budget Deficits
Budget deficits are also recent in Sweden. The public-sector
balance used to be positive for the quarter-century preceding 1978,
then peaked at a deficit of 6 percent of gross domestic product in
1982, and subsided to 1 percent in 1986. As a result, general-
government debt rose from 30 percent of gross domestic product in 1980
to 57 percent in 1986.
Budget deficits, too, will have to be financed, and there are only
two ways of financing them. First, under pure money financing of a
deficit the government issues noninterest-bearing claims upon itself,
i.e., money. Here the problem is that a larger money supply may fuel
inflation. Second, under pure bond financing of a deficit the govern-
ment issues interest-bearing claims upon itself, i.e., bonds and sells
them in the capital market. Here the problem is that a larger bond
supply may raise the rate of interest, thus crowding out private in-
vestment. The Swedish government tried to avoid that effect by issu-
ing bonds denominated in foreign currency and selling them abroad.
Thus it came to pass that budget deficits added to Sweden's foreign
debt: by 1985 such debt had risen to 29 percent of gross domestic
product, and 16 percent was public. Such foreign-currency-denominated
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debt measured in kronor will of course rise in proportion to any
Swedish devaluation of the krona .
That brings us to international aspects of the Swedish econony
IV. INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS
1. A Small Open Economy
Sweden is very small and very open: her gross national product is
a mere 3 percent of ours, but she exports 33 percent of it. At the
moment she is taking steps to make her economy even more open.
Unlike Austrian, Finnish, or Swiss neutrality, the Swedish one is
not anchored in any international agreement. But as they understand
their self-imposed neutrality, Swedes consider it to be incompatible
with formal membership of the European Community. Short of formal
membership, however, Sweden intends to move as close as possible to
the "single" European market of 1992. Such a move will have important
consequences for Swedish monetary policy.
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2. Rate of Interest
Until now restrictions on international capital movements into and
out of Sweden have left the central bank, the Riksbank, in control, a
gentle control, of the rate of interest. The government has now prom-
ised to lift the last of such restrictions by 1991. Once they are
gone, an independent Swedish monetary policy becomes impossible. A
monetary policy more expansive than that of the outside world would
simply make Swedish capitalists place their capital abroad, ultimately
making any international interest differential vanish.
3. The Rate of Exchange
The other instrument of Swedish monetary policy is the rate of
exchange. Five times in half a century, i.e., in 1931, 1949, 1977,
1981, and 1982, Sweden devalued her krona and always by a rate exceed-
ing the current difference between the growth rates of the Swedish and
the foreign money wage rates, thus leaving the krona undervalued for a
while. With each new devaluation a nonaccoramodating monetary policy
became less credible: the labor-market adversaries would remember the
frequency and magnitudes of past devaluations and count on the govern-
ment to bail them out. New rounds of domestic inflation resulted.
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Under the European Monetary System devaluation requires inter-
national consent. As Sweden moves closer to that system a nonaccom-
modating monetary policy becomes more credible: if the labor-market
adversaries allowed the Swedish money wage rate to grow faster than
that of the outside world, Swedish market shares would be lost, and
unemployment would result. The labor-market adversaries would have to
absorb the lesson that they alone were responsible for the money wage
rate.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Among capitalist economies Sweden has the most unionized labor
market, the largest public sector, and probably the most equal
disposable-income distribution. We have examined some of the problems
of such laborism.
Sweden's unemployment record is enviable. Wage pressure has
generated inflation rather than unemployment. But in passing we may
notice another country, also small and neutral, which has consistently
had half the Swedish unemployment rate and less than half the Swedish
inflation rate, i.e., Switzerland.
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Swedish wage pressure has also generated narrow wage differentials
extinguishing market signals and destroying long-run incentives to
acquire skill and education. Very high marginal tax rates have dis-
torted the choice between leisure and work and have stimulated the
underground economy: honesty has become expensive!
Such malallocation of resources is one price Sweden has paid for
her welfare state. Another is the sacrifice of personal freedom of
choice. A recent thoughtful paper by Lindbeck (1988) observed that
while Sweden stayed clear of nationalization of industry, she has
instead nationalized important spheres of family life. Daytime care
of small children has become a public good, physically produced by
government and financed by taxation. As a result the welfare state
has sharply reduced the freedom of young mothers to choose between
private and collective care. They cannot escape the high taxation by
choosing private care. Indeed the very same high taxation forces both
parents into the labor market where they do need collective care.
According to The Economist Intelligence Unit (1988-1989: 12) of all
women with children under the age of seven 85.6 percent were included
in the labor force in 1986.
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FOOTNOTE
*University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. On a recent lecture
tour of Sweden the author benefited from topical discussions with his
hosts Rolf G. H. Henriksson and Lars Werin of Stockholm, Lars Magnusson
of Uppsala, and Bo Sandelin of Gothenburg.
-23-
REFERENCES
Barro, Robert J., "The Persistence of Unemployment," Amer. Econ. Rev.
,
May 1988, 78, 32-37.
Blanchard, Oliver J., and Summers, Lawrence H. , "Hysteresis and the
European Unemployment Problem," in Cross, Rod (ed.) Unemployment,
Hysteresis and the Natural Rate Hypothesis , Oxford: Blackwell,
1988.
Bosworth, Barry P., and Rivlin, Alice M. , eds., The Swedish Economy
,
Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1987, translated
as Den svenska ekonomins f ramtidsutsikter
,
Stockholm: Studiefor-
bundet Naringsliv och Samhalle, 1987.
Cagan, Phillip, "The Demand for Currency Relative to the Total Money
Supply," J. Polit. Econ. , June 1966, 7_4, 302-328.
Dahmen, Erik, Svensk industriell fbretagarverksamhet
,
Stockholm:
Almqvist & Wiksell, 1950, translated by Axel Leijonhufvud as
-24-
Entrepreneurial Activity and the Development of Swedish Industry
,
Horaewood: Irwin, 1970.
The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Sweden
,
London,
1988-1989.
Eliasson, Gunnar, "Schumpeterian Innovation, Market Structure, and
the Stability of Industrial Development," in Hanusch, Horst, ed.
,
Evolutionary Economics, Applications of Schumpeter's Ideas
,
New
York: Cambridge U. Press, 1988, 151-199.
Ergas, Henry, and Shafer, Jeffrey, "Cutting Unemployment Through
Labour-Market Flexibility," The OECD Observer
,
Dec. 1987 - Jan.
1988, 19-21.
Freeman, Richard B., "Contraction and Expansion: The Divergence of
Private Sector and Public Sector Unionism in the United States,"
Journal of Economic Perspectives , Spring 1988, 2_, 63-88.
,
"Evaluating the European View that the United States Has
No Unemployment Problem," Amer. Econ. Rev. , May 1988, 78, 294-299
-25-
Gylfason, Thorvaldur, "Finansplanen och den ekonomiska politiken,"
Ekonomisk Debatt , No. 3, 1987, 253-257.
Lazear, Edward P., "Symposium on Public and Private Unionization,"
Journal of Economic Perspectives , Spring 1988, 2_, 59-62.
Lindbeck, Assar, and Snower, Dennis J., "Wage Setting, Unemployment,
and Insider-Outsider Relations," Amer. Econ. Rev.
,
May 1986, 76
,
235-239.
Lindbeck, Assar, "Valf ardsstaten—drivkrafter, insatser, problem,"
Ekonomisk Debatt , No. 4, 1988, 261-273.
Lundager, Jens, and Schneider, Friedrich, "En sammenligning of
udviklingen i den sorte (Skonomi for Danmark, Norge og Sverige,"
National^konomisk Tidsskrift
, 3, 1986, 124 , 362-379.
Lundberg, Erik, "The Rise and Fall of the Swedish Model," J. Econ.
Lit.
,
March 1985, 23_, 1-36.
OECD Economic Surveys 1986/1987, Sweden
,
April, 1987.
-26-
Sandelin, Bo, Den svenska ekonomin
,
Stockholm: Raben & Sjogren, 1987
Schumpeter, Joseph A., Theorie der wlrtschaf tllchen Entwlcklung
,
Leipzig: Duncker & Hurablot , 1912, translated by Redvers Opie as
The Theory of Economic Development
,
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard,
1934.
,
Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy
,
New York: Harper,
1942.
,
"English Economists and the State-Managed Economy," J.
Polit. Econ.
,
Oct. 1949, 5_7_> 371 sqq.
Smithies, Arthur, "Memorial: Joseph Alois Schumpeter, 1883-1950,"
in Harris, Seymour E., ed. , Schumpeter, Social Scientist
,
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard, 1951, 11-23.
Soderstrom, Hans Tson, ed. , "Brookingsrapporten, en kommentar av SNS
o
konjunkturrad," in Den svenska ekonomins f ramtidsutsikter
,
Stockholm: Studief orbundet Naringsliv och Samhalle, 1987, 113-134.
D/214




HECKMAN
BINDERY INC.
JUN95
, , r„ ti^J N MANCHESTERBo-J-io-no-'
,ND1ANA 46962 I

